Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 34 | Issue 2

Article 3

1-1-2018

Nuisance Law and the Doctrine of Equivalents in
Patent Law
Min-Chiuan Wang

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Min-Chiuan Wang, Nuisance Law and the Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law, 34 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 110 ().
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol34/iss2/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized editor of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com, pamjadi@scu.edu.

NUISANCE LAW AND THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS
IN PATENT LAW
Min-Chiuan Wang†
Professor Henry E. Smith claims that the doctrine of
equivalents in patent law is similar to nuisance in the area of property
law but does not provide many details. Following Smith’s theoretical
perspectives and the distinction between the exclusion and the
governance strategies in particular, this Article explains why the
doctrine of equivalents is similar to nuisance under Smith's theoretical
framework. The similarity between these sets of doctrines is then
explored through the Coase theorem and Pareto optimality, which can
account for both doctrines in a similar fashion. However, using
different concepts of welfare improvement is in order. Regarding the
legal defenses of the doctrine of equivalents, such as the prior art bar
or prosecution history estoppel, these use a preexisting Pareto
optimality as the basis of the defense.

† Associate Professor of Law, National Chiao Tung University, Taiwan; Professor Wang holds a
J.S.D. from Stanford Law School (2001), an LL.M. from Harvard Law School (1996), and an
LL.B. from National Taiwan University (1989).
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INTRODUCTION
Professor Henry E. Smith, a prominent property law theorist,
contends that the doctrine of equivalents in patent law is akin to the
doctrine of nuisance in property law, on the basis of the following:
Consistent with the exclusion strategy is today’s “peripheral”
approach to patent claims, the definition of claims focuses on
the outer bounds of what is claimed as an invention, without
the need to specify the interior. The earlier central claim
method, in which the central case of the invention was
specified and the boundaries were worked out ex post is more
of governance regime (in our terms), as is its pale reflection
in the doctrine of equivalents, under which the scope of a
claim can be extended beyond the literal reading.1
However, Smith’s explanation is short, opaque, and difficult for
readers unfamiliar with property law theory to understand. They might
1. Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements in
Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1807 (2007).
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doubt how the doctrine of equivalents, a patent law rule regarding the
right to use intangible information, could be considered similar to
nuisance law, which concerns the uses of land. It is also worth asking
whether the two doctrines are similar only under Smith’s theoretical
framework, or whether other theoretical viewpoints support their
similarity. Moreover, is this similarity valuable? Can it elucidate a
general understanding of the structure of property rights?
Nuisance law concerns conflicting land uses by neighboring
landowners, which has long been a favorite topic of economic analysis.
Nuisance disputes can be analyzed through direct cost–benefit
balancing in the Hand-Posner style,2 or Guido Calabresi’s indirect
“choosing the chooser” method.3 Smith’s analysis of nuisance law
follows the same utilitarian tradition but takes a theoretical turn by
proposing two opposing methods of delineating property rights based
on the information cost theory: the exclusion strategy, which serves as
the basic regime, and the governance strategy, which serves as the
supplemental regime.4
Nuisance law can be characterized as a hybrid regime, exhibiting
a transition from the exclusion strategy to the governance strategy. The
mixture and transition between these two strategies in property law
endows nuisance law with universal application: nuisance law can
serve as a model to illuminate legal doctrines that have a hybrid nature
in other areas of law. Based on the observation that patent infringement
exhibits the same transition from exclusion and governance, this
Article claims that the doctrine of equivalents is a type of governance
regime that has been pushed toward formalism.
The theory underlying this Article is often highlighted in the law
and economics, or property law literature: the Coase theorem,5 Pareto
efficiency,6 and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.7 These are invoked to support
the thesis that the doctrine of equivalents and nuisance law are similar,
and that the affinity in principle of these two sets of legal rules can be
appreciated from another theoretical context.

2. United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947).
3. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the Law of Nuisance, 90 VA. L. REV.
965, 969 (2004).
4. Smith, supra note 1, at 1745-46.
5. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
6. VILFREDO PARETO, MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 1-19 (Aldo Montesano et al.
eds., John Cairncross et al. trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2014) (1906).
7. John Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939); Nicholas
Kaldor, Welfare Propositions in Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON.
J. 549 (1939).
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Part I of this Article follows the context of Smith’s theory,
questioning how nuisance law can be considered similar to the doctrine
of equivalents and finding that both have a hybrid or transitional nature.
Part II engages with another theoretical perspective. Ronald
Coase’s seminal article, The Problem of Social Cost,8 has profoundly
affected property law in general and nuisance law in particular. The
connection is obvious: Coase’s article uses cases in nuisance law to
illustrate his economic theory.9 Part II restates the Coase theorem,
Pareto optimality, and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.
Part III reiterates the theories often used to analyze nuisance
law—the Coase theorem, Pareto optimality, and the balancing of costs
and benefits—as a foundation for showing the similarities between
nuisance law and the doctrine of equivalents in patent law. Nuisance
law is a typical example of cross-boundary allocations of property
rights. Whether courts can make cross-boundary allocations requires
the weighing of costs and benefits, which is reflected in elements such
as reasonableness or substantial interference. In addition, nuisance law
uses preexisting Pareto optimality as the grounds for defending against
infringement, based on the rationale that the parties expressly or
implicitly consented to the conditions of the location.10 The location
rule (i.e., the character of the neighborhood) is an example.11
Part IV links the method for determining non-literal infringement
in patent law to means of improving well-being in economics. Guido
Calabresi identifies two methods of welfare improvement—“moving
along the Pareto frontier” (the production possibilities frontier) and
“moving the Pareto frontier outward.”12 A Pareto superior move along
the frontier can be made by voluntary transactions, such as licensing
agreements, whereas moving the Pareto frontier outward refers to
innovations that make previously impossible welfare improvements
feasible.13 In patent law, an accused infringer who makes a substantial
change to the technology in question would move the Pareto frontier
outward. Even if the accused infringer did use some technological ideas
from the claimed invention, the court would find the accused product
8. Coase, supra note 5.
9. See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Making Coasean Property More Coasean,
54 J.L. & ECON. S77, S84 n.5 (2011) (listing the cases related to nuisance law in Coase’s The
Problem of Social Cost).
10. Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints,
8 J. LEGAL STUD. 49, 87-90 (1979).
11. Id. at 87.
12. Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100 YALE L.J.
1211, 1212 (1991).
13. Id. at 1212, 1231.
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or process not substantially similar to the claimed invention, and
reallocate property rights to the resource (i.e., the inventive concept of
the claimed invention) with a finding of non-infringement.
The finding of non-infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents, similar to the test of reasonableness, is a process by which
courts weigh the benefit of the defendant’s act against its cost.14 The
difference is that, in patent law, the well-being improvement that
justifies judicial reallocation of rights is even narrower; only “moving
the frontier outward” can justify the court’s reallocation of rights under
the doctrine of equivalents.
I.

SMITH’S THEORY: FROM NUISANCE LAW TO THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

In this section, this Article follows Professor Smith’s theoretical
insight, especially the contrast between the exclusion strategy and the
governance strategy, to discuss why, under his theoretical framework,
the doctrine of equivalents in patent law can be seen as resembling the
doctrine of nuisance in property law, and the value of this likeness.
A. Smith on Nuisance: Following the Utilitarian Tradition
Nuisance is the conflict between neighboring land owners
regarding how they use their respective land. Nuisance occurs when
the defendant’s acts on his own land interfere with those of the
plaintiff.15 Typical examples of such interferences include emissions of
odors, smoke, or vibrations, and such a dispute “pits two landowners
against one another.”16 “Conflicting” is the defining characteristic of
nuisance disputes, specifically a conflict between one landowner’s
interest of use and the other’s exclusion right.17 A treatise on the
relations of neighboring owners defines the doctrine of nuisance as
“[t]he basic legal mechanism for resolving disputes between neighbors
in their capacity as property holders” with “conflicts arising from the
physical proximity of [the] parties […].”18 Nuisance disputes occur

14.
15.

Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609-10 (1950).
JAMES H. BACKMAN & DAVID A. THOMAS, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO DISPUTES
BETWEEN ADJOINING LANDOWNERS—EASEMENTS § 9.03 (2017).
16. Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance Law:
1850 to 1920, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1104 (1986); Jeff L. Lewin, Compensated Injunctions
and the Evolution of Nuisance Law, 71 IOWA L. REV. 775, 775, 780 (1986).
17. Lewin, supra note 16, at 788.
18. JAMES C. SMITH & JACQUELINE P. HAND, NEIGHBORING PROPERTY OWNERS § 2:1
(2016).

2017] NUISANCE LAW & THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

115

between lands subject to various types of use, such as residential,
agricultural, or industrial use, and combinations thereof.19
The development of modern nuisance law has been deeply
influenced by the economic analysis of law and can be considered to
begin with Coase’s seminal article The Problem of Social Cost.20 Thus,
Smith’s discussion on nuisance law inevitably starts with the economic
concerns of the nuisance disputes: how the externalities caused by an
actor can be internalized.21 “When the question is how to internalize
pollution externalities or whether people bargain under the shadow of
property rules and liability rules, economic models present the dispute
as a conflict between plaintiff and defendant […].”22 This initial
observation combines Coase’s reciprocity of causality with the two-bytwo matrix of Calabresi and Melamed concerning who shall have the
entitlements (the perpetrator or the victim) and what remedy shall be
given (injunction or damages).23 “[W]hen conflicts between actors and
their activities arise, a court's job, particularly where transaction costs
are high, is to decide which use shall prevail.”24
Efficient resource allocation assumes that actors are responsible
for the costs caused by their own acts, instead of transferring the cost
to others who are neither consenting nor reimbursed for the loss, which
would become an external cost.25 Traditionally, economists assume
that an actor should be responsible for the external costs imposed on
others and account for such externalities in pricing decisions.26 Coase
proposes that we should shift the focus to considering which of the two
conflicting uses the society should opt for.27 In addition, using the least
19. Id.
20. See Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past, Present, and
Future, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189, 191 (1990) (noting that the development of nuisance law was
influenced by the law and economics movement in the 1970s). See also Lewin, supra note 16, at
785 (attributing the origin of modern nuisance law to Coase’s article).
21. See, e.g., Robert C. Ellickson, Alternative to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and
Fines as Land Use Control, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 684-86 (1973) (discussing the thesis that
nuisance law services as a mechanism of internalizing negative externalities); M. Theresa Hupp,
Efficient Land Use and the Internalization of Beneficial Spillovers: An Economic and Legal
Analysis, 31 STAN. L. REV. 457, 464 (1970).
22. Smith, supra note 3, at 966.
23. Compare Coase, supra note 5, at 2 (reciprocity of causality), and Guido Calabresi &
A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1090-92 (1972), with Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith,
What Happened to Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 391-94 (2001)
(disagreeing with the thesis of reciprocal causality and criticizing “causal agnosticism”). See also
Lewin, supra note 16, at 785-86, 789.
24. Smith, supra note 3, at 967.
25. Id. at 967-69.
26. See Coase, supra note 5, at 1-2. See also Smith, supra note 3, at 968-69.
27. Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase: Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics, and
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cost avoider strategy, the law can allocate the liability to the party who
could avoid the loss with the least cost, rather than require a non-leastcost avoider to adopt precautionary measures.28 Clear economic
consideration is evident in the elements of liability and the remedies of
modern nuisance law. Courts use various balancing tests to find either
that the defendant’s act is not a nuisance or to limit the plaintiff to the
remedy of damages.29 Since Coase’s seminal article, the legal rules of
nuisance have been significantly influenced by the Coasean approach
to the economic analysis of law.30
In addition to conflict, another defining feature of nuisance law is
its emphasis on reasonableness; the resolution of conflict is tied to the
reasonableness of the behavior.31 The idea of reasonableness in
nuisance law originated in the incorporation of tort principles during
the nineteenth century.32 Adopting the balance of utilities test or the
totality of circumstances test to define reasonable use, the courts
impose liability on a defendant’s activity characterized as
unreasonable.33 The doctrine of reasonableness has become a means
for courts to harmonize and adjust parties’ rights and privileges, and
Natural Property Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1379, 1385-86 (2010) (observing that Coase
refuted the Pigouvian view of how to internalize externalities).
28. See generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1970) (proposing the cheapest cost avoider concept for the first time). See also Guido
Calabresi & Jon T. Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 106061 (1972) (advocating that the cheapest cost avoider strategy should serve as the test for strict
liability). This term “cheapest cost avoider” denotes someone who can avoid the accident with
the least cost. It is suggested that a legal rule that imposes the liability on the cheapest cost avoider
is efficient and can promote the efficient allocation of resources. See Stephen G. Gilles,
Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest Cost-Avoider, 78 VA. L. REV. 1291, 1306 (1992).
See also Lewin, supra note 16, at 787-88.
29. Lewin, supra note 16, at 775.
30. Id. at 775, 785 (noting that the approach to modern nuisance law originated from
Coase’s 1960 article). Some commentators, however, prefer to base the explanation of nuisance
law on natural rights morality rather than on Coasean economic analysis. Claeys, supra note 27,
at 1409-11; Bone, supra note 16, at 1105-06 (proposing three natural-rights-based nuisance
models).
31. Hupp, supra note 21, at 463-64; Jeff L. Lewin, Comparative Nuisance, 50 U. PITT. L.
REV. 1009, 1018 (1989); George P. Smith, II, & Matthew Saunig, Reconceptualizing the Law of
Nuisance Through a Theory of Economic Captivity, 75 ALB. L. REV. 57, 60-62 (2012); Paul J.
Heald & James Charles Smith, The Problem of Social Cost in a Genetically Modified Age, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 87, 116 (2006). See Claeys, supra note 27, at 1419 (“Nuisance is often defined as
a direct interference with a landowner’s use rights that causes harm and is unreasonable.”).
32. Lewin, supra note 16, at 779 (“In the nineteenth century America witnessed a profound
evolution of nuisance doctrine from its roots in property law into a doctrine of tort law, imbued
with the concepts of ‘fault’ and ‘reasonableness.’”).
33. Id. at 780 (Except for a minority of “nuisance per se” cases, reasonableness is
considered under the totality of circumstances, including “the nature and location of the offending
activity, the character of the neighborhood, the frequency and extent of the intrusion, and the
effect on life, health, and the enjoyment of property.”).
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even to reach “intermediate solutions” to their legitimate but
incompatible activities.34
From the perspective of law and economics, the reasonableness of
the behavior would most likely be analyzed in terms of balancing costs
and benefits. As one commentator put it, “‘Reasonable’ activity could
be defined merely as cost-effective activity;”35 “weighing the utility of
the landowner’s use of the land and the gravity of the harm to the
neighbors was a proper method of determining reasonableness.”36
Economic analysis is at the “fulcrum” of the balancing test and should
be used in resolving nuisance disputes to promote the common good of
society—a reasonable behavior is one that could maximize the
aggregate wealth.37 However, this does not necessarily mean that
courts have often conducted explicit cost-benefit balancing or have
always made welfare-maximizing decisions. As Smith notes, judges
“often have paid no more than lip service to balancing and have instead
hewed to a more traditional mode of analysis.”38
According to Smith’s observation, nuisance law and torts are
similar from the perspective of economic analysis.39 Two types of
economic analysis are relevant here. The first approach, which has
become the mainstream view in nuisance law, is the direct balancing
of costs and benefits, as exemplified by Posner and Judge Learned
Hand.40 The tenet of this approach is to seek the optimal resource
allocation or precautionary measures to maximize the welfare of
society.41 This criterion of weighing and balancing, as applied to
nuisance disputes, is supported by the Restatement of Torts and
scholarly commentaries.42 The second approach, primarily proposed by
34. Lewin, supra note 20, at 202-05; Lewin, supra note 31, at 1011-12 (describing nuisance
law as “a series of adjustments and compromises to limit the rights and privileges of both parties”
and pointing to the possibility of intermediate solutions to incompatible economic activities).
35. Hupp, supra note 21, at 463.
36. Id. at 463 n.22. See Keys v. Romley, 64 Cal. 2d 396 (1966).
37. Smith & Saunig, supra note 31, at 62-63.
38. Smith, supra note 3, at 967.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 967-69. Judge Learned Hand developed the Carroll Towing formula in 1947. See
Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d at 173. However, the test came to prominence at the hand of Judge
Richard Posner. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 63 (7th ed.
2007). See also Richard A. Posner, Wealth Maximization and Juridical Decision-Making, 4 INT’L
REV. L. & ECON. 131, 132-33 (1984) (discussing how cost-benefit analysis can be utilized as a
tool of social choice and a guide in the governmental and judicial decision-making processes, for
the purpose of maximizing the society’s well-being).
41. Smith, supra note 3, at 969.
42. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 826-828 (AM. LAW INST.1934); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 827-828 (AM. LAW INST. 1977). See also Lewin, supra note 20, at 264
(observing that Posner’s view in the area of nuisance law comes primarily from Coase, Calabresi,
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Calabresi, is an indirect approach of “choosing the chooser”—finding
the cheapest cost avoider or the best decision maker, who can best use
the information at hand to calculate the efficiency of available
alternatives to reach an optimal point of deterrence, where the sum of
the cost of the accident and the cost of precaution is the smallest.43
Instead of directly looking for the optimal allocation of resources,
courts would place the liability on the least cost avoider among the
group of possible avoiders.44 Thus, if a polluter is considered the
cheapest cost avoider, its neighboring pollutee obtains the entitlement
to be free from pollution.45
B. Exclusion Strategy and Governance Strategy
Although he followed the path of utilitarian analysis, Smith took
a theoretical turn to focusing on the information costs of delineating
property rights. His unique contribution lies in formulating a model that
contains the “exclusion strategy,” the “governance strategy,”46 and
hybrids (as in a “spectrum”) of the two strategies47 to explain the
composition of the doctrines in nuisance law. He observes that the
doctrines in nuisance law are one of the hybrid regimes that combine
the exclusive and governance strategies.48 The economic analysis of
Melamed, and Ellickson).
43. Smith, supra note 3, at 968; Lewin, supra note 20, at 243.
44. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 28, at 1060. See also Calabresi & Melamed,
supra note 23, at 1096-97; Yuval Sinai & Benjamin Shmueli, Calabresi and Maimonides’s Tort
Law Theories—A Comparative Analysis and a Preliminary Sketch of a Modern Model of
Differential Pluralistic Tort Liability Based on the Two Theories, 26 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 59,
66-67 (2014).
45. Smith, supra note 3, at 969. See also Barbara Ann White, Risk-Utility Analysis and the
Learned Hand Formula: A Hand That Helps or A Hand That Hides?, 32 ARIZ. L. REV. 77, 79
(1990).
46. See Henry E. Smith, Property and Property Rules, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1719, 1728
(2004) (describing the exclusion strategy as one “in which very rough signals—like presence
inside or outside a boundary line around a parcel of land—are used to protect an indefinite class
of uses with minimal precision,” and the governance strategy as one in which “the internalization
problem is solved on something close to a use-by-use basis . . . using signals that pick out and
protect individual uses and user behavior”).
47. Id. (arguing that between the two poles—i.e., the exclusion strategy and the governance
strategy—are “strategies of a mixed sort that bunch uses together under variables of intermediate
precision”); Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50
ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 446 (2008) (explaining that his information-cost theory derives a model
consisting of “two poles and a spectrum of strategies for delineating and enforcing property
rights” and various hybrid models in-between). Smith maintains that water laws—both
riparianism and prior appropriation—are other examples of such hybrid systems. Id. at 458.
48. Smith traces the distinction of the exclusion strategy and the governance strategy to
economist Steven Cheung and property law theorist Carol M. Rose. Henry E. Smith, Exclusion
versus Governance: Two Strategies for Delineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S453,
S455-56 (2002).
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law, seemingly more consistent with the governance strategy,
considers nuisance law from the perspectives of cost–benefit balancing
and the reasonableness of use.49 Traditional legal analysis, nonetheless,
focuses more on the paradigm of in rem rights—which is more
consistent with the exclusion strategy—and looks for signs of intrusion
into boundaries. As Smith observes, the Coasean approach of building
property rights stick by stick “is not at all how the law usually
proceeds” with nuisance disputes.50 Courts often simply ask whether
the plaintiff’s rights are violated, and then to inquire into whether the
plaintiff’s rights are infringed, they often look into whether the
defendant’s act physically invades the plaintiff’s land.51
Professor Thomas W. Merrill, in a paper coauthored with Smith,
disparages the “bundle-of-rights” view of property that has become
dominant in American property law since the last century.52 Influenced
by legal realism and the economic analysis of law, the bundle-of-rights
concept incorporates rights into ownership in a stick-by-stick manner.
“Coase assumed that property is the result of decisions over useconflicts and that property is, in essence, a list of use rights.”53 Yet as
Merrill and Smith observe, the bundle-of-rights view is not a unique
creation by Coase but the consensus of the American legal academia in
the mid-twentieth century.54 In this view, the question of what rights
should be given to whom is not predetermined, but determined in an ad
hoc manner and then incorporated into the concept of ownership.55 For
Merrill and Smith, however, this ad hoc manner of composing property
rights imposes high transaction costs on participants in the economy.56
The in rem nature of property imposes on all others the duty of
noninterference.57 The ad hoc, stick-by-stick method of composing

49. Smith, supra note 3, at 973.
50. Id. at 969-70.
51. Id. (noting that courts and the commentators, based on corrective justice, often place
emphasis on the physical invasion aspect of nuisance cases).
52. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at S90-92.
53. Smith, supra note 3, at 1001.
54. Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at S80-81 (noting that the “bundle-of-rights” view of
property was a “thoroughly modern notion” at the time when Coase created his seminal works,
and that property was considered as a “minisovereignty” of the owner over a thing during the
nineteenth century or earlier).
55. Smith, supra note 3, at 969; Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at S82 (describing the legal
realist concept of property as “a bundle of rights or sticks,” with the term “property” serving as a
label attached to a set of rights and duties. The contents of the bundle “vary from thing to thing,
from place to place, and even from person to person.”).
56. Merrill & Smith, supra note 9, at S78.
57. Id. at S81.
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rights heavily burdens the addressees of the rights discourse (i.e., the
potential infringers of rights).58
Both exclusion and governance are means of internalizing
externalities.59 Smith argues that it makes sense, according to
information cost theory, to treat exclusion as the basic regime and
governance as the supplemental regime.60 The exclusion strategy,
which defines the property right as an in rem right that entitles the
owner to exclude the interference of all others, focuses on the
enforcement of boundaries.61 This is to entrust the information problem
to the owner, who serves as the “gatekeeper” of the resource.62
Boundaries are the special feature of the exclusion regime, since the
exclusion strategy uses coarse proxies, particularly boundaries.63
The exclusion rule serves as the “baseline” for evaluating
nuisance cases. For example, in cases of substantial harm caused by the
defendant’s behavior, the court does not need to measure the attributes
of an individual use but applies the exclusion rule directly. The rule of
nuisance per se shows the use of exclusion rules in nuisance disputes.64
Nuisance cases are also related to the location of the use conflict in
question, for several reasons. First, traditionally, to evaluate whether
nuisance occurs, the disturbance must originate from the defendant’s
land and cause harm on the use of the plaintiff’s land. In other words,
whether the defendant’s behavior enters into the space of the plaintiff’s
land is defined by the ad coelum rule.65 Second, whether a use
constitutes nuisance is highly relevant to the characteristics of the
neighborhood; the community standards become the threshold of
nuisance liability.66 Smith considers both the boundaries and the
58. Id. at S89-90.
59. Smith, supra note 3, at 980-81.
60. Id. at 975-76, 988-92, 1006-07, 1032, 1046-49.
61. Id. at 972-73, 978-79.
62. Id. at 972-73. The exclusion strategy sees the owner as the “gatekeeper” of the
resources. See Smith, supra note 48, at S454-55, n.3 (quoting the view of James E. Penner).
63. Smith, supra note 48, at S454-55 (the right of exclusion uses rough proxies such as
boundaries and the ad coelum rule).
64. Smith, supra note 3, at 997-98 (explaining that when the disturbance caused by the
defendant’s use is significant or obvious, the defendant constructively deprives the plaintiff of his
or her possession and, consequently, the court can apply the exclusion rule directly and need not
evaluate the context of use). Nuisance per se is an act that causes material harm so that the
contextual information regarding the location of the act and the parties is very unlikely to change
the result of the decision; in such a situation, there is little benefit for the court to incur more costs
by inquiring into contextual factors of the use. See id.
65. See id. at 998 (noting that “nuisance is about invasions of a more ethereal sort”). See
also id. at 999 (“Traditionally . . . location and physical invasion are very important informational
variables in the law of nuisance.”).
66. See, e.g., id. at 1002-04 (describing the locality rule).
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location as the essential and typical variables of the exclusion
strategy.67 Finally, the remedies for nuisance cases include injunctions,
applying the property rule and exclusion to protect the “delegation” to
the property owner to decide how to use the resource.68
At the other pole of the spectrum of the “organizational
dimension” of property rights,69 the governance strategy often
functions as a supplemental strategy.70 The governance strategy
measures some essential uses of the resource, and considers the
appropriateness of each use. This is a more precise and delicate method
but incurs higher measurement costs.71 The governance strategy
corresponds to a view of property rights closer to that of legal realism
or Coase.72 The use of the governance strategy is often justified when
the resource at issue has a higher value or when the transaction cost is
high because of the higher information cost involved.73
The major distinction between the exclusion strategy and the
governance strategy lies in that, in the former, the court focuses on the
enforcement of boundaries, with entry into boundaries serving as a
coarse information variable to define the rights and to indirectly protect
various uses within the boundaries.74 In the governance strategy, the
court focuses on defining the reasonable scope of the right. The court
looks into whether the use is reasonable or proper, and even conducts
cost–benefit balancing;75 a governance regime is “a set of rules of
proper use.”76 In defining the reasonable scope of rights, the court has
more room to coordinate the conflicting interests of the right owner and
the user. Therefore, the governance strategy is more likely to emerge
in areas that require balancing of the interests of the right owner and
the user.77 When multiple uses become more necessary, coarse
variables (such as entry into the boundaries) are inadequate to handle
67. Id. at 1004-05.
68. Id. at 1005.
69. Smith, supra note 48, at S454-55, S467 (arguing that this spectrum “reflects the costs
and benefits of proxy measurement”); accord Claeys, supra note 27, at 1405 (a spectrum between
limited rights of use and unlimited rights of possession).
70. Smith conceives the exclusion strategy as the major mode of property composition,
while the governance strategy serves as a supplemental strategy to further refine property rights.
See Smith, supra note 48, at S456.
71. Id. at S467.
72. Smith, supra note 3, at 976.
73. Id. at 996-97 (noting that the governance strategy is used when “high[er] stakes” are
present or when the costs of contracting are high).
74. Id. at 972-73.
75. Id. at 973-74.
76. Id. at 975-76.
77. Fair use in copyright law is a typical example of the governance regime. Smith, supra
note 1, at 1812-14.
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the conflicting multiple uses; thus, the court requires more precise
variables to measure the uses directly.78
At the remedy stage of nuisance cases, a shift from the exclusion
strategy to the governance strategy is often evident. The exclusion
strategy is often combined with property rules and injunctions, whereas
the governance strategy is more likely when the value of coexisting
uses becomes higher. The governance strategy allows the parties to
adjust their relation by contracting, and it also allows the court to
measure the attributes of each individual use and to tailor the remedy
accordingly. “As multiple uses become more important, a governance
regime of some sort should tend to emerge [...].”79
Smith proposes that nuisance law is a mixture of the exclusion
strategy and the governance strategy, or a transitional scheme shifting
from exclusion to governance.80 He suggests that “nuisance is not so
much a mess or a mystery as a hybrid between different methods of
delineating rights, which reflects the information costs incurred in
employing these strategies.”81 Smith’s further contribution is to explain
the choice between the exclusion strategy and the governance strategy
with the information cost theory.82 He contends that the exclusion
strategy is the lower-cost strategy between the two.83 The same result
is evident in Richard Epstein’s contention of “the dominance of
property rules.”84 Quoting Hume, Epstein states that the stability of
possession is “one of the dominant rules of society.”85 In nuisance
cases, as Epstein observed, injunction is the basic rule in the situation
of substantial nuisance.86 The law normally attempts to deter invasion,
and property rights can be changed only through voluntary
transaction.87
C. Nuisance Law and Patent Infringement as Two Hybrid
Regimes
The foundation of nuisance law is primarily the exclusion regime,
which is supplemented with the governance regime. According to
78. Smith, supra note 3, at 981-82.
79. Id. at 1005-06.
80. Id. at 996-97, 1002.
81. Id. at 970.
82. Id. at 974, 981-82, 996-97.
83. Id. at 980-85.
84. Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of the Property
Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091, 2096-2105 (1997).
85. Id. at 2097.
86. Id. at 2101.
87. Id.
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Smith, this is a relatively low-cost method of delineating rights.88
“Nuisance employs this exclusion regime when it comes to gross
invasions of clear boundaries, but supplements the exclusion regime
with fine-tuned governance rules.”89
The universal applicability of nuisance law lies in the coexistence
of the exclusion strategy, the inherent governance strategy, and its clear
transition from exclusion to governance.90 “Nuisance rests on a
foundation of exclusion, […] but it also fine-tunes this hard-edged
regime where the stakes are high enough and courts have some
advantage in providing off-the-rack governance rules.”91 Shifting from
the exclusion model to the governance model—that is, shifting from
boundaries as the information variable to the attributes of use—this
type of transition can also be observed in easement by necessity or
water law. When this sort of shifting occurs is an empirical question.92
Portraying nuisance as where “property law encounters tort law”
clearly indicates the transition from the exclusion strategy to the
governance strategy.93 Whereas the traditional approach of nuisance
law was based on the physical invasion test94 and focused on intrusion
across boundaries, the modern approach of nuisance law focuses on
evaluating the attributes of uses.95 The transitional nature of nuisance
law, as demonstrated by Carol M. Rose in her essay on the historical
evolution of water rights, entails a change from monopoly (absolute
rights) to vaguely-defined, commonly-owned group rights.96 In light of
Smith’s theory, the early stage can be construed as an exclusion regime
focused on the boundaries, and the later stage as a governance regime
focused on the direct evaluation of the attributes of uses. Using a finetuned governance model, judicial governance can create greater
benefits of multiple uses of the same resource. The intersecting area
near the boundaries is often where the court can exercise governance.
88. Smith, supra note 3, at 976.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 976, 1045.
91. Id. at 1024.
92. Id. at 1024-25.
93. Epstein, supra note 10, at 49 (“Nuisance is a very old branch of tort law.”); accord
William L. Prosser, Nuisance Without Fault, 20 TEX. L. REV. 399, 410-16 (1942).
94. See Claeys, supra note 27, at 1409 (“[A] nuisance suit ordinarily requires some
physical invasion.”). See also Epstein, supra note 10, at 53 (“Nuisances are invasions of the
plaintiff’s property that fall short of trespasses”); id. at 57 (“[O]nly physical invasion of protected
interests gives rise to a prima facie case of liability.”).
95. Smith, supra note 3, at 974.
96. CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION: ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY, THEORY,
AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 166, 179-80 (1994) (Water law played an important role in the
later nineteenth-century nuisance law, which shows an evolution process from absolute rights to
commonly-owned correlative rights).
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To elucidate Smith’s claim that the doctrine of equivalents is
similar to nuisance law, this pronouncement must be placed in the
context of his theory that distinguishes the exclusion strategy and the
governance strategy. Two forms of patent infringement exist, literal
infringement and infringement by equivalency. Infringement by
equivalency is considered the “second prong” of patent infringement.97
For literal infringement, the exclusion strategy is applied, as it is for the
cause of action of trespass: a literal infringement has occurred if the
patent claim reads on the accused device, substance, or procedure.98
For infringement by equivalency, as with nuisance, the governance
strategy is applied. The judicial role in the determination of
equivalency, just as in nuisance cases, is twofold: the court must
exercise contextual judgment, making an integrated decision based on
a series of relevant factors, and as a result, the decision of equivalency
must draw fair boundaries of the patentee’s rights.99
The determination of equivalency must be context based. As the
U.S. Supreme Court indicated in Graver Tank Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air
Products Co., “[w]hat constitutes equivalency must be determined
against the context of the patent, the prior art, and the particular
circumstances of the case.”100 One particular distinction that
exemplifies the contextual nature of equivalency decisions is
interchangeability being listed by the Graver Tank court as an
“important factor” that supports the finding of equivalency;101
however, it is only one factor to be considered among others.
“Equivalency, in patent law, is not the prisoner of a formula and is not
an absolute to be considered in a vacuum.”102 This famous
pronouncement by the Graver Tank court reveals the contextual nature
97. See generally Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1423, 1443 (Fed.
Cir. 1997); Penwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 952 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(distinguishing literal infringement and infringement by equivalency); Cybor Corp. v. FAS
Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Abraxis Bioscience, Inc. v. Mayne Pharma
(USA) Inc., 467 F.3d 1370, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Sean T. Moorhead, The Doctrine of
Equivalents: Rarely Actionable Non-Literal Infringement or the Second Prong of Patent
Infringement Charges?, 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1421, 1424 (1992).
98. Clyde F. Willian & Joseph S. Miller, Muddy Waters: Infringement Analysis after
Markman and Warner-Jenkinson, 7 FED. CIR. B.J. 227, 227 (1997) (assimilating patent
infringement to trespassing on the territory over which the patentee can exercise his power of
exclusion).
99. Mark D. Janis, Who's Afraid of Functional Claims? Reforming the Patent Law's § 112,
¶ 6 Jurisprudence, 15 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 231, 263 (1999)
(“equivalency as a flexible tool for advancing ‘general fairness’”).
100. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609 (1950).
101. Id. See Ring & Pinion Serv. Inc. v. ARB Corp. Ltd., 743 F.3d 831, 834 (Fed. Cir. 2014)
(known interchangeability as a factor to be considered); Abraxis Bioscience, Inc., 467 F.3d at
1382.
102. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609.
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of decisions concerning equivalency, which must be determined
“against the context of the patent” and is “not an absolute.”103 All of
these statements characterize the doctrine of equivalents as a
governance regime.
The doctrine of equivalents as a governance regime is most clearly
revealed in the Federal Circuit’s decision in Hilton Davis Chemical Co.
v. Warner-Jenkinson Company, Inc.104 Hilton Davis, an en banc
decision by the Federal Circuit to resolve the issues related to the
doctrine of equivalents,105 proclaimed to “restate” rather than to
“revise” the test for infringement under the doctrine of equivalents in
previous case law.106 Hilton Davis elevated the substantiality of the
difference to the primary criterion for assessing equivalency.107 By
tying equivalency to a somewhat vague standard,108 the Hilton Davis
court paved the way for judicial exercise of governance in the
determination of equivalency.
The Hilton Davis decision first quoted Justice Story’s opinion in
Odiorne v. Winkley109 to establish that equivalency denotes
nonsubstantial or “[m]ere colorable differences, or slight
improvements, [which] cannot shake the right of the original
inventor.”110 To avoid constituting infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents, the accused product or process must embody a substantial,
not merely colorable, change of the claimed product or process.111 The
court also cited the Supreme Court’s Graver Tank decision for the same
principle: “the doctrine [of equivalents] applies if, and only if, the
differences between the claimed and accused products or processes are
insubstantial.”112

103. Id.
104. Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1512, 1516-28 (Fed.
Cir. 1995).
105. Id. at 1515 n.1.
106. Id. at 1516. See James K. Folker, A Legislative Proposal to Clarify and Simplify Patent
Infringement Analysis under the Doctrine of Equivalents, 6 FED. CIR. B.J. 211, 212 (1996).
107. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1518 (holding that “the application of the doctrine of
equivalents rests on the substantiality of the differences between the claimed and accused products
and processes, assessed according to an objective standard”); id. at 1517 (treating insubstantial
differences as “the necessary predicate” for constituting equivalency).
108. Moorhead, supra note 97, at 1428 (noting that “there are no bright lines” in the
determination of equivalency).
109. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1530.
110. Id. at 1517 (citing Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F.Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D. Mass. 1814)).
111. See, e.g., Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929) (no substantial
departure from the patent, a mere colorable departure therefrom).
112. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1519 (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co.,
339 U.S. 605, 610 (1950)).
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The Federal Circuit in Hilton Davis also proclaimed that
equivalency is fundamentally the determination of substantial
difference, and that the tripartite test of means, function, and result is a
method to measure the difference.113 However, although these three
factors contribute to determining equivalency, additional factors
exist.114 The tripartite test is without a doubt the most prevalent
approach,115 with function, way, and result serving as proxies for the
substantiality of differences because “similarity of function, way, and
result leaves little room for doubt that only insubstantial differences
distinguish the accused product or process from the claims.”116 Other
factors related to the determination of equivalency include known
interchangeability,117 evidence of copying, and evidence of
circumvention designs.118 The court also emphasized that all evidence
concerning the substantiality of differences, if presented by the record
of the case, should be considered by the fact finder.119
The Hilton Davis approach to the doctrine of equivalents presents
a typical governance regime, employing a standard-based mode of
adjudication. As a clear voice of the governance strategy, the Federal
Circuit proclaimed, citing the majority opinion of the Supreme Court’s
Graver Tank decision, that “equivalency, in patent law, is not the
prisoner of a formula.”120 The standard-based approach to determining
equivalency was previously revealed by the Graver Tank majority
opinion.121 The governance strategy allows courts, through weighing
multiple factors in a standard-based adjudication, to simulate the Pareto
optimality that would be reached under the ideal conditions. The
approach to determining equivalency in the Federal Circuit’s Hilton

113. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1518.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. For known interchangeability as a factor weighing in favor of finding infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents, see Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609; Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc.
v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 36 (1997); Corning Glass Works v. Sumitomo Elec.
U.S.A., Inc., 868 F.2d 1251, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Interactive Pictures Corp. v. Infinite Pictures,
Inc., 274 F.3d 1371, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
118. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1519-20.
119. Id. at 1518.
120. Id. (citing Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609).
121. See John R. Thomas, Claim Re-Construction: The Doctrine of Equivalents in the PostMarkman Era, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 153, 156 (2005) (contrasting the Supreme Court
majority’s standards-oriented approach in Graver Tank with the dissenting opinion’s rules-based
approach to the doctrine of equivalents). See also 4 R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS
§ 13:68 (4th ed. 2017) (characterizing the different approaches to the determination of factual
equivalency as rules versus standards).
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Davis decision is similar to how reasonableness is determined in
nuisance law.
Nevertheless, the governance strategy may be formalized for
several reasons and turned into a rules-based mode of adjudication,
which can be embodied in an exclusion regime in property law.122 One
of the reasons courts develop formal concepts and rules is to reduce the
information costs of measuring multiple proxies.123 In addition, an
increase in the value of the asset brings the need to enhance the
predictability of judicial decisions, pushing the rule system further
toward the direction of formalism and the exclusion strategy.124
However, because a rule covers more limited facts than a standard
does, it often requires combining several rules—some serving as the
boundaries of the right (as baselines in property) and some serving as
defenses to the right (as exceptions in property)125—to achieve what a
standard-based mode of adjudication can do, which is to approximate
Pareto optimality under the ideal conditions.
Through its decision in Warner-Jenkinson Company, Inc. v.
Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,126 the Supreme Court, sharing the anxiety
that the dissenters in Graver Tank and Hilton Davis felt toward the
standard-based mode of adjudication,127 effected a formalistic turn in
the doctrine of equivalency. The Warner-Jenkinson decision used
several rules (in the end, a myriad of rules) to replace the standardbased adjudication model established in Graver Tank and Hilton Davis.
If the approach pronounced by the Federal Circuit in Hilton Davis was
able to continue its path, the determination of equivalency today would
probably resemble how the likelihood of confusion is determined in
trademark law. However, the Supreme Court’s formalistic turn in
Warner-Jenkinson wove a complicated web of rules, consisting not
only of rules (the all-elements rule, the function-way-result test, the
insubstantial differences test),128 but also exceptions to the rules
(prosecution history estoppel, claim vitiation),129 as well as exceptions
to the exceptions (several exceptions to prosecution history
122. Henry E. Smith, On the Economy of Concepts in Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2097,
2105-06 (2012) (the right of exclusion and “owner-as-the-gatekeeper” are formal concepts).
Smith defines formalism as relative indifference to context; a rule system more formal in its
application and interpretation is less dependent on context. Id. at 2105.
123. See id. at 2108.
124. Smith, supra note 1, at 1815-17.
125. For the distinction of baselines and exceptions in property, see Smith, supra note 122,
at 2120-27.
126. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17 (1997).
127. Id. at 28-29.
128. Id. at 39-40.
129. Id. at 40-41.
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estoppel).130 The Supreme Court’s decision in Festo Corporation v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd. continued this path of
constructing a complex rule system, admitting three exceptions to
prosecution history estoppel.131
The Supreme Court’s formalistic turn since the Warner-Jenkinson
decision shows the Court’s anxiety concerning the vague boundaries of
rights under a governance regime, and represents the Court’s pursuit of
the value of certainty, which could be the virtue of an exclusion regime.
Ultimately, the doctrine of equivalents, much like nuisance law,
consists of a hybrid regime of exclusion and governance. Nonetheless,
the doctrine of equivalents since Warner-Jenkinson has been pushed
further toward formalism and rules-based adjudication.132
II.

ANOTHER INTERPRETATION OF NUISANCE AND THE
DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

This section adopts another interpretive approach, based on
economist Ronald Coase’ seminal article The Problem of Social Cost,
and incorporates related annotations and extensions by other scholars,
to explore the issue put forward by Professor Smith: the similarity
between nuisance law and the doctrine of equivalents.
A. Basic Theory: Coase Theorem, Pareto Optimality, and
Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency
In The Problem of Social Cost, Coase uses an example of nuisance
law to illustrate his critique of the externality theory. Later, the
theoretical literature on nuisance law, having been heavily influenced
by law and economics, rather naturally started the discussion with
Coase’s theoretical insight.133
130. Id.; id. at 39 n.8 (for the rule of claim vitiation).
131. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 740-41
(2002). The three exceptions to prosecution history estoppel are: (i) equivalents unforeseeable at
the time of the amendment, (ii) the rationale underlying the amendment bearing merely a
tangential relation to the equivalent in question, and (iii) some other reason “suggesting that the
patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in
question.” Id.
132. See generally John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV.
771, 792 (2003) (“Patent jurisprudence increasingly reflects a trend towards adjudicative rule
formalism.”).
133. See generally Christopher Essert, Nuisance and the Normative Boundaries of
Ownership, 52 TULSA L. REV. 85, 92 (2016) (Coase placed nuisance law at the center of law and
economics); Keith N. Hylton, A Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 977,
979 n.11 (1996) (Coase used nuisance law to illustrate his critique of the externality theory);
Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: Communities and Individuals in
Law and Economics, 92 GA. L. REV. 75, 93 (2004) (Coase challenged the Piguvian approach to
externalities).
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One of Coase’s major points is the reciprocal nature of harm: if
two conflicting uses of a resource exist, the nonowner’s use does not
necessarily cause damage to the owner.134 This occurs because if the
law enjoins the nonowner’s use, the nonowner could suffer loss;
moreover, if the law allows the nonowner’s use, the owner could suffer
loss.135 Since either party could suffer loss, the question then becomes
which party the law chooses to sacrifice in order to avoid the more
serious harm; the law could choose to permit the nonowner’s use and
let the owner suffer, or vice versa.136 Therefore, it is not necessarily the
case that someone may not use another’s property. The reciprocal
nature of harm presupposes the separation of ownership with some
privileges of use.
Another major point is that, if the world were frictionless (i.e.,
without transaction costs),137 parties would solve use conflicts by
themselves through their bargaining and contracting, and society as a
whole would be better off.138 In a frictionless society where transaction
costs are absent, “Pareto optimality or economic efficiency will occur
regardless of the initial entitlement.”139 In other words, if the market is
well-functioning, resource allocation would reach the point of
equilibrium through the operation of private bargaining, regardless of
how the law defines the rights and duties initially.140
Scholarly commentary reveals two important corollaries of the
Coase theorem. First, given the initial allocation of property rights and
under certain conditions (including the condition of a world without
transaction costs), private bargaining would move resource allocation

134. See Essert, supra note 133, at 88-92 (restating and critiquing the reciprocal nature of
harm).
135. Gregory C. Keating, Nuisance as a Strict Liability Wrong, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 2 (2012).
136. Kenneth R. Vogel, The Coase Theorem and California Animal Trespass Law, 16 J.
LEGAL STUD. 149, 150 (1987); Essert, supra note 133, at 89.
137. Brett Frischmann & Evan Selinger, Utopia?: A Technologically Determined World of
Frictionless Transactions, Optimized Production, and Maximal Happiness, 64 UCLA L. REV.
DISCOURSE 372, 375-76 (2016) (Coase’s frictionless world).
138. Herbert Hovenkamp, Fractured Markets and Legal Institutions, 100 IOWA L. REV. 617,
619 (2015) (private bargaining would solve the problem of conflicting use); Parchomovsky &
Siegelman, supra note 133, at 93.
139. Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 23, at 1094-95. See Calabresi, supra note 12, at 1215.
140. Coase, supra note 5, at 6; Harold Demsetz, R.H. Coase and the Neoclassical Model of
the Economic System, 54 J.L. & ECON. S7, S11 (2011) (agreeing to Coase’s neoclassical claim
under the assumption that the transaction cost is zero). See R.H. Coase, The Federal
Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1, 26-27 (1959) (discussing an example within the
case Sturges v. Bridgman, [1879] 11 Ch. D. 852, in which private bargaining leads to
equilibrium); Robert Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 14 (1982).
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to an equilibrium.141 This is known as the efficiency thesis.142 Second,
the agreement by the parties would move the resource allocation to an
equilibrium regardless of how the law assigns rights and duties
initially. This is known as the invariance thesis.143 According to Coase,
under the condition that bargaining is costless and with an initial
definition of property rights, parties would reallocate resources by their
consent and reach an efficient outcome.144
However, the market requires costs, and Coase was the first to
admit it.145 After transaction costs are considered, the parties may not
transact and reach an agreement as easily.146 Even if a rearrangement
of property rights could cause an increase in the value of production,
the parties’ failure to bargain because of the transaction costs may
require the government (through legislature, courts, or administrative
agencies) to rearrange rights for them, and the initial allocation of rights
also matters.147 “In these conditions the initial delimitation of legal
rights does have an effect on the efficiency with which the economic
system operates. One arrangement of rights may bring about a greater
value of production than any other.”148

141. See Donald H. Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & ECON. 427, 427
(1972) (the preconditions of the Coase theorem include full competition, zero transaction cost,
full information, etc.); Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthews L. Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some
Experimental Test, 25 J.L. & ECON. 73, 73 (1982) (identifying eight preconditions of the Coase
theorem). See also Herbert Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 CORNELL
L. REV. 783, 785-87 (1990) (further simplifying the preconditions of the Coase theorem).
142. For the meaning of the efficiency thesis and the invariance thesis, see Hovenkamp,
supra note 141, at 785 (stating the two sub-theses under the Coase theorem); Cooter, supra note
140, at 15; Regan, supra note 141, at 427 (restating the efficiency thesis and the invariance thesis);
Hoffman & Spitzer, supra note 141, at 73 (combining the efficiency thesis and the invariance
thesis and proposing the preconditions to Coase theorem); Hovenkamp, supra note 138, at 62829.
143. See Demsetz, supra note 140, at S11; Cooter, supra note 140, at 15 (discrediting the
invariance thesis); Vogel, supra note 136, at 151 (criticizing the invariance thesis); Calabresi,
supra note 12, at 1222-23. James M. Buchanan calls the invariance thesis allocational neutrality.
See J. M. Buchanan, The Coase Theorem and the Theory of the State, 13 NAT. RESOURCES J. 579,
580, 584-85 (1973) (allocational neutrality means that if the parties can voluntarily transact under
ideal conditions, the initial allocation of property rights is irrelevant). See also Hovenkamp, supra
note 138, at 628.
144. Coase, supra note 5, at 8.
145. Id. at 15. See Demsetz, supra note 140, at S11 (stating that “[b]read does not fall like
manna on the dinner table. It comes at a cost. Similarly, transactions are not free.”); Parchomovsky
& Siegelman, supra note 133, at 94.
146. See Demsetz, supra note 140, at S12 (the existence of transaction costs could cause the
inefficiency of the market).
147. Hovenkamp, supra note 138, at 619 (“[T]ransaction costs make a legal system
important to social ordering.”).
148. Coase, supra note 5, at 16. See Cooter, supra note 140, at 18; Hovenkamp, supra note
141, at 809.
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Therefore, in the realistic setting where a transaction requires
costs, the government could, subject to some conditions, attempt to
rearrange rights to approximate what the parties would have agreed to
in a zero-cost transaction.149 To restate the proposition, based on a
certain initial definition of rights, the government could rearrange and
thus change the initial definition of rights if doing so would result in an
increase in the value of production.150 However, the government’s best
effort to approximate the equilibrium would not be the same, because
true equilibrium is defined by the parties’ consent in no-cost
bargaining, which is an “unreachable goal.”151 When the costs of
government intervention—as well the motive and capacity of courts or
agencies—are considered, no guarantee exists that the governmental
rearrangement of rights would approach an ideal result, rather than a
“false optimum.”152
Although Coase does not specifically identify the concept of
equilibrium he used in Social Cost, some commentators have identified
the equilibrium concept here as Pareto optimality.153 Thus, it is
appropriate to introduce Pareto optimality in the context of this paper.
The discussion on Pareto optimality typically starts with the scenario
of a bilateral monopoly:154 Assuming that a society consists only of two
persons A and B, and only of two types of consumption goods x and y,
all the consumption goods (x and y) are distributed to A and B.155
Pareto optimality is a situation containing no Pareto superiority, such
that a situation with no further distribution of resources and goods
would make one individual better without making another individual
worse.156 In other words, Pareto optimality is a status without resource
149. See Guido Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liability Rules – a
Comment, 11 J.L. & ECON. 67, 69 (1968) (arguing that the aim of governmental relocation of
resources is an attempt to approximate the result of zero-cost bargaining as closely as possible
and at low cost).
150. By contrast, some commentators hold that Coasean analysis suggests that little or no
government intervention would be the best approach. Calabresi, however, disagrees, and contends
that the Coasean analysis can be used to justify government actions. Id. at 73.
151. Id. at 69.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 68; Regan, supra note 141, at 428-29; Vogel, supra note 136, at 151; Hoffman &
Spitzer, supra note 141, at 75-76.
154. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 17 (4th ed. 2004).
155. The scenario that Coase presupposed is akin to this situation, where two persons vie
for control of a scarce resource. See Demsetz, supra note 140, at S12.
156. See Barbara White, Coase and the Courts: Economics for the Common Man, 72 IOWA
L. REV. 577, 585 (1987); Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 23, at 1094 (describing Pareto
optimality), 1095-96 (different initial allocations of rights result in different Pareto optimalities);
Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOSFTRA L. REV. 509, 513
(1980) (the relation of Pareto superiority to Pareto optimality).
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misallocation, typically represented with an Edgeworth box shown in
Figure 1:

Figure 1: Edgeworth Box

Consider the initial allocation of property rights as (x, y), and the
new allocation of rights, achieved either by private bargaining or by
government intervention, as (x’, y’). The parties’ bargaining, assuming
transaction costs are zero or low, is the most efficient means of moving
from (x, y) to (x’, y’), which is true Pareto optimality and an
equilibrium. Substitutes for transaction (such as some type of
government intervention) have costs, so the optimal result they achieve
may approximate, but not necessarily be the same as, true optimality
(x’, y’).157
Torts on property rights can be seen as unilaterally taking some
uses of a resource owned by another.158 B’s conduct causing damage to
A’s use of property (thus reducing the value x) can be seen as B
unilaterally taking more of A’s use of property (x) than was originally
distributed between A and B. Therefore, B’s conduct deviates from the
original equilibrium (x, y) and violates the unanimous consent
requirement of the Pareto ethic.159 If the parties were voluntarily
157. See Calabresi, supra note 149, at 69 (asking “have we instead approached a false
optimum by a series of games which are not worth the candles used?”).
158. For the concept of the terms “thing” and “use” here, see Henry E. Smith, Property as
the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1693 (2012).
159. For the principle of consent under the Pareto ethic, see Richard A. Posner, The Ethical
and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV.
487, 488 (1980).
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transacting, B would be obliged to pay more of her use of property (y)
to obtain more of A’s use of property (x), such that A and B would
agree to a new allocation of property rights (x’, y’), which represents a
new Pareto optimality.160 In the end, if B’s conduct has not changed the
constraint on the decision (i.e., a set of transaction costs),161 the court
would enforce the original property right, refuse to create a new
allocation, and demand that B return to the original allocation of
resources (x, y),162 which represents the original Pareto optimality prior
to B’s conduct.163
However, if B’s conduct had caused the constraint on the decision
to be changed—for instance, if B’s conduct were innovative164—the
court would be willing to rearrange property rights to achieve a new
Pareto optimality. As Coase shows, an increase in the value of
production can trigger a rearrangement of rights.
In a world with positive transaction costs, Coase adds two more
conditions:165 First, because rearranging rights requires costs, only
when the increase in value resulting from the rearrangement is greater
than the associated costs would a rearrangement of rights occur.166
Second, rearrangement by the parties bargaining privately and
rearrangement by government intervention are alternative
mechanisms.167 The cost of private bargaining must be greater than the
cost of government invention for the government to step in to rearrange
rights.168
In summary, if a governmental rearrangement of property rights
(including by courts) can result in an increased value of production,
and the increased value is greater than the costs incurred during this
160. See Hovenkamp, supra note 141, at 627 (in Coasean markets, moving resources
requires the unanimous consent of the relevant parties).
161. See Calabresi, supra note 12, at 1212 (given a set of transaction costs, Pareto optimality
will always and immediately be reached).
162. Otherwise it would not be a Pareto improvement, because B would be made better off
but A would be made worse off. See Posner, supra note 159, at 488.
163. This is because the status quo—here, the state of affairs before B’s conduct—is a Pareto
optimality until a new, better, and achievable arrangement is found. Calabresi, supra note 12, at
1215-16. See Mark A. Geistfeld, Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts: Carrying Calabresi
Further, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 165, 166 (2014).
164. An innovation can shift the Pareto frontier outward and thus change the utility
possibility frontier. Calabresi, supra note 12, at 1212.
165. Coase, supra note 5, at 15-18.
166. See Hovenkamp, supra note 138, at 623 (for a transactional or nontransactional move
of resources, if the transaction cost is higher than the increased value, the move would not occur).
167. Coase, supra note 5, at 17-18.
168. Calabresi, supra note 149, at 71-72 (using public highways and rubber bumpers as
examples); Frischmann & Selinger, supra note 137, at 375-76 (using a frictionless world as the
baseline to evaluate and compare different mechanisms in the real world).
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process, which are lower than the costs of private bargaining, then the
government can intervene to rearrange the initial definition of property
rights. This ex post redefinition of property rights adjusts the uses of
resources belonging to the relevant parties. Finally, the result of this
adjustment of property rights by the government could approach, but
would still not be the same as, the result of the parties’ bargaining and
contracting, which is the only means of producing true optimality.
Therefore, the increase in the value of production is key; with
certain conditions, such an increase could result in the rearrangement
of rights by the government. However, “increase in the value of
production” must be defined.
Calabresi presents two means for welfare improvement centered
on the concept of a Pareto frontier: moving “along the frontier” and
“shifting the frontier outward.”169 The Pareto frontier (production
possibilities frontier) is a set of feasible allocations given a certain
technological level.170 Moving along the frontier is one “in which there
are winners and losers,” and it improves well-being so long as the
winner wins more than the loser loses.171 Shifting the frontier outward
as a result of innovations or technological advances “create[s] winners
and may or may not create losers as well.”172
Both moving along the Pareto frontier and shifting the frontier
outward can increase the value of production. The innovations that can
shift the Pareto frontier outward include not only material and
technological ones but also “moral, aesthetic, and altruistic” ones.173
For instance, Geistfeld argues that legal innovations, such as an
innovation in the compensatory tort system, can shift the Pareto frontier
outward from the status quo.174 Nonetheless, as Calabresi notes,
improving well-being by shifting the frontier outward is a much less
discussed topic in the economic literature than moving to or along the
frontier.175
In reality, as a principle of unanimous consent under ideal
conditions, Pareto optimality cannot be easily achieved. It is argued
that most legal institutions implement Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, a
169. Calabresi, supra note 12, at 1230-31.
170. See Geistfeld, supra note 163, at 166 (noting that transactions costs and existing
technology define the Pareto frontier); Matthew Dimick, Should the Law Do Anything About
Economic Inequality?, 26 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 13, 33 (2016) (discussing
technologically feasible allocations located within and on the Pareto frontier).
171. Calabresi, supra note 12, at 1221, 1229-30.
172. Id. at 1230-32.
173. Id. at 1235.
174. Geistfeld, supra note 163, at 168, 187-88.
175. Calabresi, supra note 12, at 1227, 1235-36.
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criterion of hypothetical consent under nonideal conditions.176 Judge
Posner observes that “when an economist says that free trade or
competition or the control of pollution or some other policy or state of
the world is efficient, nine times out of ten he means Kaldor-Hicks
efficient.”177 Matthew Adler also observes that Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency dominates administrative regulation.178
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, also known as “potential Pareto
superiority,”179 is a less austere concept of efficiency.180 It is a criterion
of hypothetical compensation: it requires only that “the increase in
value be sufficiently large that the losers could be fully
compensated”181 and is ultimately not concerned with whether the
winners actually do compensate the losers.182 Serving as the basis of
cost–benefit analysis,183 the Kaldor-Hicks criterion is “the relationship
between the aggregate benefits of a situation and the aggregate costs of
the situation,” “without regard to how those costs and benefits are
distributed among different individuals.”184
An obvious problem of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is that, even if a
reallocation promotes the collective welfare, the losers are left to bear
the loss.185 Though theoretically the winners could compensate the
losers, in reality when the law assigns rights to the winners, the winners
have no incentive to compensate the losers.186 By contrast, the Pareto
criterion requires that the winners actually compensate the losers.187
The governmental ex post rearrangement of rights can be seen as a type
of compulsory exchange, approximating the outcome of private
176. W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 80 (4th ed.
2005); Posner, supra note 159, at 495; Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking CostBenefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 170 (1999).
177. POSNER, supra note 40, at 13.
178. Matthew D. Adler, Beyond Efficiency and Procedure: A Welfarist Theory of
Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 241, 244 (2000).
179. Posner, supra note 159, at 491; POSNER, supra note 40, at 13 (arguing that KaldorHicks efficiency has the potential of becoming Pareto optimal if the losers are fully compensated
by the winners).
180. Geistfeld, supra note 163, at 170.
181. Posner, supra note 159, at 491 (emphasis added).
182. Dimick, supra note 170, at 46 (stating that if the compensation does occur, then the
situation also satisfies Pareto efficiency).
183. Geistfeld, supra note 163, at 170.
184. Adler, supra note 178, at 245 n.13.
185. Calabresi, supra note 12, at 1223 (observing that an involuntary and uncompensated
Kaldor-Hicks improvement is not really an “improvement”).
186. Jules Coleman, The Normative Basis of Economic Analysis: A Critical Review of
Richard Posner's the Economics of Justice, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (1982) (observing that,
following Posner’s approach, assigning the right to the polluter would free the polluter from the
obligation to purchase the right to pollute from its neighbors).
187. Calabresi, supra note 12, at 1222-23.
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bargaining and contracting. In other words, based on the initial
definition of property rights, the parties can bargain by themselves to
reach an equivalency, or—as a less costly alternative—the government
can arrange their rights, mimicking188 but not necessarily attaining the
equivalency reached by private bargaining.189 Although the
governmental reallocation may not be identical to the optimality
reached by the parties themselves, the Pareto criterion that requires the
losers to actually be compensated would bring the outcome closer to
true equilibrium than the Kaldor-Hicks criterion would.190
B. Explaining Neighboring Relations
1. General Principles
In a world with zero transaction costs, the law cannot only clearly
define the rights and let the parties voluntarily transact; if the
transaction cost is too high, contracting may not begin or be
consummated. The situation may therefore require the court to allocate
the rights among the parties directly. This type of reallocation of rights
and duties occurs across the boundaries of property.191 Ellickson
proposes handling externality by redefining property rights—that is,
cross-boundary allocation of rights and duties—and the law of
nuisance is an example of this approach.192
If (x, y) represents the initial allocation of rights between two
neighboring owners A and B, the initial definition of property rights is
A(x, y) and B(x, y). The assumption here is that all of A’s use of
property (x) belongs to A, and all of B’s use of property (y) belongs to
B. This allocation of rights can be termed the “geometric-box
allocation of rights,”193 or the Blackstonian default package.194
However, sometimes between neighboring owners, even if A
seems to conduct his affairs within the boundaries of his property, he
still takes some of the use of B’s property. For instance, even if A’s
house is completely constructed on A’s land, A still needs the lateral
188. See Coleman, supra note 186, at 1108 (stating Posner’s thesis that the law should
mimic the market).
189. Coase, supra note 5, at 18 (claiming that governmental regulation may or may not
increase efficiency).
190. Coleman, supra note 186, at 1109 (noting that it is highly unlikely that assigning rights
by the Kaldor-Hicks criterion would produce Pareto optimal outcomes).
191. Ellickson, supra note 21, at 683; Smith, supra note 3, at 1002 (cross-boundary
allocation of rights and duties based on the relative value of two uses).
192. Ellickson, supra note 21, at 683.
193. Stewart E. Sterk, Neighbors in American Land Law, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 55 (1987)
(describing the “’geometric-box’ allocation of rights”).
194. Smith, supra note 3, at 1002.
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support of B’s land. In other words, A still takes one use of B’s land—
the lateral support.195 A’s domain of control contains part of B’s use of
property (y); likewise, B’s domain of control contains part of A’s use
of property (x). Thus, the initial allocation of rights between two
neighboring owners should be A(x, y) and B(x, y). Here, x and y are
each more than or equal to zero. (Henceforth, this paper assumes a
scenario in which B interferes with A’s use of property. Thus, A may
be referred to as the plaintiff, and B may be referred to as the
defendant.)
Nonetheless, quoting the tort law scholar Prosser, Coase states, “a
person may make use of his own property or … conduct his own affairs
at the expense of some harm to his neighbors.”196 For instance, B may
conduct his activity within the boundaries of his property, but his
activity may cause damages to his neighbor A. In other words, B by his
conduct takes some of A’s use of property, and by his unilateral
conduct B reduces the amount of A’s property use from x to x’. A is
damaged by B’s conduct since the new amount of property use (x’) is
less than the original amount of his property use (x). Some of A’s
property use is taken by B. If the parties could voluntarily transact (for
instance, if the transaction cost is zero or extremely low), the parties
would adjust B’s amount of property use from y to y’. In other words,
B should pay some of his property use to A in order to compensate A
for his loss. Ultimately, they would arrive at a new allocation of
property use (x’, y’), which would become the new equilibrium. In
summary, based on the initial allocation of property rights, the parties
conduct transactions by contracting and reach equilibrium.
According to the Pareto test, if B’s activity takes more of A’s use
of property, B must compensate A. If the parties cannot reach an
agreement by themselves, the law can simulate the result of the parties’
possible transaction and distribute the reimbursement to A. The court
would determine the value that B takes from A’s use of property (that
is, the reduction of the value of x), and determine the value that should
be subtracted from B’s use of property (y) and given to A to
compensate A for the loss of property use (x).197 After this process, the
benefits are raised for all, but the parties are still in the optimal status.
195. Ellickson, supra note 21, at 719; Smith, supra note 48, at S469 (exclusion does not
mean to control all the use of the resources); SMITH & HAND, supra note 4, § 4:2 (neighboring
landowners have the mutual obligation of lateral support).
196. Coase, supra note 5, at 19.
197. More precisely, the value of y that should be deducted may not be only the value of the
reduction in x. This is because if B profits from using of A’s property, the court may have to
distribute the profits as the fruits of their “cooperation.” See Regan, supra note 141, at 429
(benefits of cooperation should be divided in a variable-sum game).

138

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 34

In brief, based on the initial allocation of property rights, the
government conducts a cross-boundary reallocation of rights. This ex
post allocation of rights deviates from the original “geometric-box
allocation of rights” or the Blackstonian default package.198
Nonetheless some legal rules allow B to obtain more of A’s use
of property without compensating A. These rules reduce only the value
of x (A’s use of property) but make no change to the value of y (B’s
use of property). Coase, still quoting Prosser, states, “The world must
have factories, smelters, oil refineries, noisy machinery and blasting,
even at the expense of some inconvenience to those in the vicinity, and
the plaintiff may be required to accept some not unreasonable
discomfort for the general good.”199 These rules follow Kaldor-Hicks
efficiency.
2. Nuisance Law as an Example
Private nuisance is an interference in which the defendant’s
conduct causes damage to the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of land.200
In other words, by a unilateral act, the defendant takes part of the
plaintiff’s use of the land (represented by x), thus reducing the value of
x.
To determine whether a private nuisance exists, the court
considers factors such as the substantiality and the reasonableness of
the defendant’s interference with the plaintiff’s enjoyment and use.201
Reasonableness is determined with reference to the totality of
circumstances surrounding the defendant’s conduct.202 Courts often use
a list of factors to scrutinize this conduct; some refer to the severity of
harm (such as the extent and the character of harm), whereas some
evaluate the utility of the defendant’s conduct (such as the social value
of the defendant’s primary purpose).203 This approach is championed

198. Sterk, supra note 193, at 55. Nonetheless it should be noted that the government’s
second allocation (in contrast to the initial allocation) of rights may either compensate or not
compensate the loser. Cross-boundary allocation of rights was considered to be incompatible with
the laissez-faire distribution of property rights. Nonetheless, Ellickson believes that in some
circumstances, to depart from the ad coelum rule and distribute property rights across the
boundaries is a more equitable and efficient approach to dealing with externalities caused by
property uses. Ellickson, supra note 21, at 719.
199. Coase, supra note 5, at 19-20.
200. See Claeys, supra note 27, at 1419.
201. See id. (listing causation, harm, and reasonableness as the elements of nuisance
liability).
202. HERBERT HOVENKAMP & SHELDON F. KURTZ, PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW 424 (6th
ed. 2005).
203. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
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by the Second Restatement of Torts.204 The court should make a caseby-case evaluation of the total benefit and total loss caused by the
defendant’s use of land.205
In terms of allocative efficiency, reasonableness means that the
total benefit of the defendant’s act that takes the neighboring owner’s
use of property outweighs the loss suffered by the plaintiff from such
taking. If the defendant’s act is reasonable, the court should allow it
and realign the parties’ property rights, giving rise to a new allocation
(x’, y’). If the defendant’s act is unreasonable, which means the loss it
causes outweighs its benefit, the court should enjoin the defendant’s
act and return to the original allocation between the parties (x, y).
Nonetheless, one factor for determining reasonableness, the
character of the neighborhood, represents a Pareto optimal point
previously reached when the party purchased the property within the
neighborhood.206 The character of the neighborhood is the threshold of
liability in nuisance law, which means that an activity considered
normal in the neighborhood should not be treated as a nuisance (but it
may be a nuisance at another place).207 This rule, known as the locality
rule, makes the character of the neighborhood a decisive factor of, or
even a defense to, the liability of nuisance.208
Ellickson argues that the character of the neighborhood as a
threshold of liability imposes a restriction on internalization of
externalities suffered by neighboring landowners.209 The concept of
normalcy (or neighborliness) refers to the standard of the contemporary
community and is empirically established. In a community, people
often have a rough consensus on normal conduct, such as what
constitutes normal land uses.210 This local consensus shows that the
locality rule relies on a Pareto optimal point already reached among the
204. See id. §§ 827-28 (1977) (providing major factors to be weighed).
205. Smith, supra note 3, at 1003. See Ellickson, supra note 21, at 748 (making out a prima
facie nuisance case should not entitle a defendant to remedies); Epstein, supra note 10, at 61;
Claeys, supra note 27, at 1420 (reasonableness often requires “all-the-circumstances balancing”);
Adler & Posner, supra note 176, at 177-84 (explaining the more precise method of cost-benefit
analysis).
206. See Epstein, supra note 10, at 61.
207. Smith, supra note 3, at 1002-03.
208. Bove v. Donner-Hanner Coke Co., 258 N.Y.S. 229, 232 (N.Y. App. Div. 1932); Reed
v. Cook Constr. Co., Inc., 336 So.2d 724, 725 (Miss. 1976); Smith, supra note 3, at 1002-03;
Ellickson, supra note 21, at 749 n.233; Claeys, supra note 27, at 1421 (the locality rule is an
important factor related to reasonableness).
209. Ellickson, supra note 21, at 728.
210. Id. at 729. See Wade v. Miller, 73 N.E. 849 (Mass. 1905) (the odor from henhouses
and the cackling of hens and crowing of roosters in an agricultural area); Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926) (“[A] pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard.”);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 828 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
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neighbors regarding what is normal; normal or above-normal conduct
does not entail liability. The established Pareto optimal point thus
serves as a defense to liability. In addition, imposing liability only on
subnormal conduct lowers administrative costs.211
Epstein’s “implicit in-kind compensation” further explains why
the locality rule invokes a formerly established Pareto optimal point as
a defense to nuisance liability.212 He explained the “implicit in-kind
compensation” as follows: “the uniformity of activities throughout any
given area makes it highly likely that benefits obtained by having each
person inflict limited nuisances upon the others will more than offset
the losses sustained from having to tolerate the nuisances inflicted by
others.”213 A landowner in the community has implicitly received
compensation, either from reciprocal harms in a “live and let live”
manner or from the price of land purchase, for the loss he suffers. As
Epstein states, it is “unlikely that any person will buy land in heavily
industrialized regions with the idea of using it for residential
property.”214 Thus neighborliness or normalcy expresses a consensus
among the people in the community, who have implicitly consented to
the character of the neighborhood at some point in time; the consensus
thus becomes the basis for a defense to liability.
The requirement of substantial harm means that if the plaintiff
suffers from slight or petty inconveniences, the level of interference is
insufficient to impose liability.215 The element of substantial harm can
be explained by cost–benefit balancing and allocative efficiency.
Recall that when the costs outweigh the benefits, the court does not
reallocate rights between the parties. In addition, Ellickson mentions
the requirement of substantial harm: “If plaintiffs are allowed to bring
suits for trivial damages, the administrative costs involved are likely to
exceed the efficiency gains of permitting such suits.”216 In other words,
after administrative costs are considered, the benefits arising from the
plaintiff claiming rights in situations of petty annoyances is outweighed
by the costs, which include the costs to both parties and the judicial
costs of making and enforcing decisions.217 In contrast to Ellickson’s
211. Ellickson, supra note 21, at 731-32.
212. Epstein, supra note 10, at 90.
213. Id. at 88.
214. Id. at 89.
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. g (AM. LAW INST. 1979). See Rogers
v. Elliott, 15 N.E. 768, 769 (Mass. 1988) (ringing of a church bell near the plaintiff’s house). See
also Lewis v. Stiles, 551 N.Y.S.2d 557, 558 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (holding that the “disturbances
of dog barking, children frolicking, and the discordant sounds of music and outdoor summer life
do not . . . rise to the level of substantial and unreasonable interference . . .”).
216. Ellickson, supra note 21, at 737.
217. See Epstein, supra note 10, at 76 (explaining administrative costs).
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focus on the costs of litigation, Rabin’s analysis focuses on balancing
the utilities of the defendant’s conduct itself: “The substantiality of an
interference depends on the benefits as well as the burdens that the
plaintiff’s land receives from the defendant’s land.”218
The Second Restatement of Torts explicitly endorses the approach
in which the court in nuisance cases weighs the related benefits and
costs.219 In nuisance cases, the governance strategy is evident not only
at the stage of liability, but at the stage of remedies as well. The
governance strategy employed at the liability stage is shown by
nuisance law’s standard-based, rather than rules-based, approach, as
evidenced by the court’s implicit or explicit cost–benefit balancing.220
The governance at the stage of remedies indicates that modern nuisance
law allows the court to shun an “all-or-nothing” decision that merely
allows or enjoins the defendant’s conduct.221 Even if the court finds a
nuisance, it may choose not to ban the defendant’s use completely but
to revise the defendant’s future course of conduct.222 The court may
choose not to enjoin a nuisance but—following Calabresi and
Melamed’s Rule 2—require the defendant to pay permanent
damages.223 This type of judgment is judicial mimicking of the Pareto
optimality that the parties could have reached; in other words, it is a
type of judicially coerced cooperation.
III.

EXPLAINING THE DOCTRINE OF EQUIVALENTS

The analysis of relations between neighbors focuses on whether
the user takes the proprietor’s use of property, and how to compare the
benefits of such taking against its costs so that the overall welfare is
increased by the taking. The analysis of the doctrine of equivalents in
patent law also focuses on whether the accused infringer takes the use
of the patent owner’s claimed invention, but it requires showing a
218. Edward Rabin, Nuisance Law: Rethinking Fundamental Assumptions, 63 VA. L. REV.
1299, 1319 (1977).
219. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). See Thomas W.
Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance, and the Costs of Determining Property Rights, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.
13, 17 (1985); Hendricks v. Stalnaker, 380 S.E.2d 198, 202 (W. Va. 1989).
220. See Merrill, supra note 219, at 17. See also Escobar v. Cont’l Baking Co., 596 N.E.2d
394, 395 (Mass. 1992) (listing relevant factors to be weighed when considering whether damages
should be awarded).
221. See Merrill, supra note 219, at 19 (characterizing nuisance law as a “judgmental
entitlement-determination rule”).
222. See Daugherty v. Ashton Feed & Grain Co., Inc., 303 N.W.2d 64, 69 (Neb. 1981);
Eaton v. Cormier, 748 A.2d 1006, 1008 (Me. 2000); HOVENKAMP & KURTZ, supra note 202, at
424-25; SMITH & HAND, supra note 18, § 2:20 (a court in a nuisance case may order the defendant
to modify his future activities).
223. See, e.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 874-75 (1970).
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different type of welfare improvement to justify the accused infringer’s
taking and to immunize it from liability.
The determination of equivalency is divided into two parts:
factual equivalency (the test for equivalency) and legal defenses.224
Factual equivalency is the determination of whether the claimed
invention and the accused product or process are equivalent.225
Generally speaking, factual equivalency can be determined by the
insubstantial differences test,226 the tripartite function-way-result
test,227 or the known interchangeability test.228 In Warner-Jenkinson,
the Supreme Court opined that for determining equivalency, “[T]he
particular linguistic framework used is less important than whether the
test is probative of the essential inquiry: Does the accused product or
process contain elements identical or equivalent to each claimed
element of the patented invention?”229 This “essential inquiry” is
whether the defendant has taken the use of the claimed invention. The
use of the “thing” taken here is the inventive concept of the plaintiff’s
patent. As one commentator notes, the substantial differences test and
the tripartite test represent “a rough attempt to identify whether the
accused activity has made use of the inventive concept that the patentee
was attempting to set out in the patent claim.”230
In addition, the evidence of the defense to equivalency is not
necessarily related to similarity with the technology in question. The
evidence of some important defenses, such as the prior art bar or
prosecution history estoppel, is different from the evidence concerning
the comparison of factual equivalency. A successful assertion of one of
these defenses bars the infringement by equivalents, regardless of
whether the accused product or process is factually similar to the
claimed invention. This is because, as explained in the later sections of
this paper, these legal defenses are based on a policy rationale different

224. See M. Scott Boone, Defining and Refining the Doctrine of Equivalents: Notice and
Prior Art, Language and Fraud, 43 IDEA 645, 649 (2003) (equivalence analysis contains two
steps: the test for equivalence and legal bars to equivalence).
225. Id.
226. Id. at 650.
227. See 6 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS, III, ET AL., PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 20:49 (2d
ed. 2011) (observing that the tripartite test is one of the approaches of proving equivalency, but
not the only test).
228. See 4 MOY, supra note 121, § 13:65; Boone, supra note 224, at 650 (listing the tripartite
test, the substantial differences test, and the known interchangeability test as the major tests for
determining equivalency). See also 6 MILLS ET AL., supra note 227, § 20:49 (noting that
equivalency is “equated with interchangeability”).
229. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997).
230. 4 MOY, supra note 121, § 13:63.
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from that of factual equivalency. These two sets of rules are not of the
same nature with respect to the functions they serve.
A. Determining Factual Equivalency
The inquiry of factual equivalency is to determine whether the
accused product or process “used” the inventive concept of the claimed
invention.231 The Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson stated that the
“essential inquiry” is whether “the accused product or process
contain[s] elements identical or equivalent to” every claimed element
of the plaintiff’s patent.232 Different “linguistic frameworks” (denoting
methods of equivalent analysis) are only the means to answer this
essential question.233 If we treat the inventive concept of a patent as the
“thing,”234 patent infringement occurs when the use of the thing owned
by the patentee was taken by another. In an equivalent analysis, if the
accused product or process is not substantially different from the
elements of the claimed invention, the patentee’s use of the thing was
taken by the infringer. By contrast, if the accused product or process is
substantially different from the claimed invention, the accused
infringer did not take the patentee’s use of the thing. The test of
substantial differences is therefore a method of determining whether
the alleged infringer has taken the patentee’s use of a thing (her
inventive concept).
In determining whether a substantial difference exists, courts
often ask whether the defendant has made a substantial change to the
technical means.235 If the means have been changed substantially, the
claimed invention and the accused product or process are not in fact
equivalent. However, they are equivalent if the change is
insignificant.236 For example, in the classic case Sanitary Refrigerator
Co. v. Winters, the Supreme Court made the following statement: “A
close copy which seeks to use the substance of the invention, and,
although showing some change in form and position, uses substantially
the same devices, performing precisely the same effects with no change
in principle, constitutes an infringement.”237 The Federal Circuit also
231. See id. § 13:69.
232. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40.
233. Id.
234. See Smith, supra note 158, at 1693.
235. 4 MOY, supra note 121, § 13:5 (citing Odiorne v. Winkley, 18 F.Cas. 581, 582 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1814)).
236. See Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. DePuy-Motech, Inc., 74 F.3d 1216, 1222 (Fed. Cir.
1996); Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 822 F.2d 1528, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1987);
Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 934 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
237. Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winter, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (2d Cir. 1929).
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reasoned in London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co. that infringement by
equivalents arises “where an infringer, instead of inventing around a
patent by making a substantial change, merely makes an insubstantial
change, essentially misappropriating or even ‘stealing’ the patented
invention . . .”238
Thus, the concept of substantial differences may encompass two
facets, one addressing the substantial identity of the accused product or
process to the claimed invention,239 the other addressing the substantial
change made by the accused infringer. Though these two facets facially
seem the same, they have different connotations. The concept of
substantial identity measures the degree to which the patentee’s use of
the thing—the inventive concept of the claimed invention—is taken by
the alleged infringer.240 As stated by the Federal Circuit in Hilton
Davis, substantial identify refers to a situation “where a device is a
copy of the thing described by the patentee, ‘either without variation,
or with such variations as are consistent with its being in substance the
same thing.’”241
However, the concept of substantial change measures how far the
accused infringer altered the means of the claimed invention, and
whether such an alteration is considered significant or miniscule.242
Thus, the finding of substantial change measures the degree to which
the accused infringer, though perhaps a user of the patentee’s inventive
concept, has made contributions to the technology in question. A
finding that the change was insubstantial indicates that the infringer’s
contribution to the art was minimal.243 Thus, these two concepts are
proxies for different activities of the accused infringer: substantial
identity measures the degree of taking, and substantial change
measures the contribution to the art in question. Courts often consider
it as a matter of course that a finding of substantial change and a finding
of substantial identity negate each other.244
Making substantial change, for example, by successfully
designing around a patent,245 could shift the Pareto frontier outward,
238. London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (emphasis
added).
239. See Sanitary Refrigerator, 280 U.S. at 41-42; Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. WarnerJenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1512, 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co.
of Michigan, Inc., 873 F.2d 1422, 1425 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
240. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1526 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator, 280 U.S. at 41-42).
241. Id.
242. Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. DePuy-Motech, Inc., 74 F.3d 1216, 1221-22 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
243. Vermont Indus., Inc. v. Reinke Mfg. Co., Inc., 983 F.2d 1039, 1043 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
244. See Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1517-18. See also Sofamor, 74 F.3d at 1222.
245. Hilton Davis, 62 F.3d at 1520; Paul N. Katz & Robert R. Riddle, Designing Around a
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because innovation is one major approach to shifting or tilting the
production possibility frontier.246 However, if the accused infringer
merely makes use of the inventive concept of the patented invention,
without modification or with only insignificant modification, even
though it is possible that the benefit to the infringer could be greater
than the loss to the patentee, the situation is merely moving along the
frontier. If the patentee is not compensated, the result could fall to the
southwest side of the Pareto frontier. This situation is what the Supreme
Court termed “fraud on a patent” in Graver Tank.247 The doctrine of
equivalence ensures that this situation falls within the ambit of the
patent right.248
The purpose of the patent system is to promote the progress of
science and technology. The U.S. Constitution lists “to promote the
Progress of … useful Arts” as the goal of the patent system.249 Given
this purpose, the only case where patent law reallocates rights is where
the actor promotes the progress of technology. In cases where the actor
seeks only a redistribution of wealth based on existing technology,
patent law does not reallocate rights. In contrast to property law, both
cases where the production value is increased, whether “moving along
the Pareto frontier” or “moving the Pareto frontier outward,” can
trigger the government’s reallocation of rights. Patent law reallocates
rights only in cases of shifting the Pareto frontier outward. In cases that
only move along the Pareto frontier, patent law does not reallocate
rights but requires a return to the original property right. If the parties
are seeking wealth redistribution under the same technological level,
the law requires the parties to reach voluntary agreements by
contracting.
The primary test for equivalency is substantial difference, because
substantial difference means that the accused infringer has made a
substantial innovation rather than staying on the same Pareto frontier
to seek redistribution. Also, in cases where the parties remain on the
same frontier and the taker does not reimburse the patent holder, the
result may even fall to the southwest side of the Pareto frontier.
United States Patent, 45 S. TEX. L. REV. 647, 671 (2004) (a successful design-around promotes
public benefits).
246. Jane R. Bambauer, Glass Half Empty, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 434, 438-39
(2016). See John Buck, Movement of the Production Possibilities Frontier, ECON. PERSP. (Apr.
7, 2008, 12:01 AM), http://bit.do/econpersp.
247. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950). See also
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 234 F.3d 558, 593 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(en banc).
248. See Christopher A. Cotropia, “After-Arising” Technologies and Tailoring Patent
Scope, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 151, 159-60 (2005).
249. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
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Other major tests of equivalency can be explained by the same
rationale. The tripartite test is only one means of determining
substantial difference, and its principle is the same as that of the
substantial differences test (i.e., distinguishing whether the accused
infringer is seeking redistribution based on the same technology or
whether substantial innovation has been made to shift the Pareto
frontier outward).250 The principle is the same for interchangeability:
the fact that, at the time of infringement, one skilled in the art does not
know that the two elements are interchangeable, indicates that the
accused infringer has made innovative contributions to the
technology.251 The test of substantial change measures the degree of
the accused infringer’s contribution; the more substantial the change,
the larger the contribution, and the further the Pareto frontier is moved
outward.252 No matter what test the court uses—whether substantial
differences, the tripartite test, or interchangeability—the real point, as
pronounced by the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson, is to
determine whether the accused product or process is identical or
equivalent to the claimed patent elements.253 In other words, these tests
are all designed to determine whether the accused infringer took the
use of the inventive concept of the patent in question. Purely taking the
inventive concept of a patent without making a substantial change falls
under “moving along the Pareto frontier,” rather than “shifting the
frontier outward.”
In patent infringement, to move along the Pareto frontier is to
redistribute the same resource: the inventive concept of the claimed
invention. This redistribution could improve well-being if done
through transactions, but it must be premised on respecting property
rights and voluntary contracting by the parties. If someone takes the
inventive concept of the claimed invention without making a
substantial change, the infringer profits from the taking while making
the patentee worse off, and the Supreme Court calls this situation
“fraud on a patent.”254 Taking is not permissible unless the taker makes
a substantial change to the invention, which means the Pareto frontier
is shifted outward or tilted. In cases where an alleged infringer makes
a substantial change, courts could find such acts non-infringing, and
make a new allocation of property rights to redistribute the resource

250. See Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40 (1997).
251. Id. at 37-38.
252. See Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1512, 1517-18
(Fed. Cir. 1995).
253. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 40.
254. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607-08 (1950).
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(the inventive concept of the claimed invention), even if the alleged
infringer did use the inventive concept in question.
Behind this reasoning is the idea that patent law encourages
technological innovation, which is expressed in economic terms as
tilting or shifting the Pareto frontier outward, and denotes creation in
technology, knowledge, or other types of innovations that “make
possible improvements in well-being which previously were not
feasible.”255 Examples of welfare improvements listed by Calabresi
include “a better wheat, cheaper solar energy, superconductors,
manna.”256 Patent law, nonetheless, does not require a pioneering
innovation for a patent to be granted, not to mention that the threshold
of sufficient innovation to avoid an infringement is lower than that of
obtaining a patent.257 Yet just moving along the frontier without
making a substantial innovation is considered to be merely taking the
same inventive concept, no matter what tests the court resorts to.
B. Preexisting Pareto Optimality as the Defense to
Infringement
The defenses to the application of the doctrine of equivalents are
often based on separate rationales from factual equivalency itself.
Courts and commentators often suggest that the defenses are founded
on the public-notice function of the patent. This section suggests that
several of the defenses are related to Pareto optimality, or the allocation
of property rights, consented to by the patent owner and the PTO.
1. Prior Art Bar
Interpreted from the contractarian view, a patent grant could be
considered an agreement between the patent owner and the state
(representative of the public).258 This agreement is premised on two
conditions: first, that the invention is fully disclosed in the
specification,259 and second, that the claimed invention and prior art are
sufficiently different.260 The second precondition indicates that prior
255. Calabresi, supra note 12, at 1229.
256. Id. at 1229-30.
257. For the distinction between a pioneering patent and an improvement, see Jean M.
Barkley, The Doctrine of Equivalents Analysis After Wilson Sporting Goods, 35 ARIZ. L. REV.
765, 774 (1993).
258. See Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim
Scope: A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1989 (2005).
259. See id. at 1951 (“The enablement standard requires a person having ordinary skill in
the art be able to make and use the embodiments claimed in the patent without undue
experimentation.”).
260. 4 MOY, supra note 121, §13:80.

148

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 34

art serves as the background of the consent between the patent owner
and the patent office regarding the patent grant; both agree that the
patentee may not base her claim on prior art and that the patented
invention must be sufficiently different from prior art.261
From this viewpoint, it is clear that the prior bar to patent
infringement is a defense based on a Pareto optimality existing at the
time of the patent grant. Two conditions—that the patentee may not
claim patent coverage that would ensnare the prior art, 262 and that the
patented invention must sufficiently differ from the prior art—are
inherently contained in the parties’ consent that reaches the initial
Pareto optimality. The prior art bar excludes the patentee from claiming
embodiments that are not novel, in addition to those obvious in light of
the prior art, in view of the ordinary skill in the art.263 These are all part
of the allocation of property rights (P) concluded by the transaction
between the patent owner and the patent office, which consents on
behalf of the public.264
Using a hypothetical claim to further examine the range of
equivalents265 is consistent with the premise that the prior art bar
represents in part the original Pareto optimality (i.e., the original
allocation of property rights between the patentee and the public),
because a patentee may not obtain a patent with a scope that covers
prior art.266 If a hypothetical claim violates the conditions of
patentability (such as covering prior art), the patent holder’s claim of
equivalency would be considered non-P.267 As the Federal Circuit
stated in Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey and Associates:
“a patentee should not be able to obtain, under the doctrine of
261. Folker, supra note 106, at 218; Anand Gupta, Patent Law: The Supreme Court
Reinforces the Validity of the Doctrine of Equivalents in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chemical Co., 23 S. ILL. U.L.J. 123, 131 (1998).
262. See Glenn K. Beaton, File Wrapper Estoppel and the Federal Circuit, 68 DENV. U.L.
REV. 283, 284 (1991) (“[E]quivalents cannot be used to expand the claims to cover the prior art.”).
See Barkley, supra note 257, at 782 (noting that prior bar limitation restricts the range of
equivalents).
263. Key Mfg. Group, Inc. v. Microdot, Inc., 925 F.2d 1444, 1449 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (prior
art would make the accused product obvious); Boone, supra note 224, at 657, 670.
264. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 21 (2009) (stating the rationale of the prior art bar: the patent holder may
not claim, by way of the doctrine of equivalents, scope which he may not obtain literally).
265. Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (noting that the court may “conceptualize the limitation on the scope of equivalents by
visualizing a hypothetical patent claim, sufficient in scope to literally cover the accused product”
in order to determine whether prior art limits the range of equivalents) (emphasis omitted).
266. Id. See also 4 MOY, supra note 121, §§ 13:80, 13:83; Barkley, supra note 257, at 772.
267. Barkley, supra note 257, at 773 (“[I]f the hypothetical claim would not have been
patentable over the prior art, it forecloses a finding of infringement because the range of
equivalents cannot reach the accused product without ensnaring the prior art.”).
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equivalents, coverage which he could not lawfully have obtained from
the PTO by literal claims.”268
The patent holder’s assertion of infringement is grounded in the
original Pareto optimality and the corresponding allocation of property
rights. If the scope of the patent, as asserted by the patentee through the
doctrine of equivalents, violates the requirements of patentability, her
assertion of the right would violate the original agreement between her
and the patent office. It is obvious that one may not claim protection of
her property right (P) through the doctrine of equivalents if in the end
the assertion of equivalency would violate her property right (thus nonP). Prior art limitations to the doctrine of equivalents mean that the
patent holder’s assertion of her property right falls into the category of
non-P.269 From another angle, raising the prior art bar as a defense
seems to be the alleged infringer’s insistence that the patent scope
should be limited to the original Pareto optimality.
2. Prosecution History Estoppel and the DisclosureDedication Doctrine
Prosecution history estoppel and the disclosure–dedication
doctrine are two limitations on the doctrine of equivalents similarly
based on the acts of the patentee during the course of patent
prosecution. Both refer to the Pareto optimality established by
consensus between the patent holder and the PTO. The optimality is
embodied in an allocation of rights between the patentee and the public;
thus, this allocation is considered P.
Prosecution history estoppel is based on the acts, including
narrowing amendments, of the patentee during the prosecution of her
patent; the subject matter relinquished for the purpose of securing a
patent grant may not later be reclaimed through the assertion of the
doctrine of equivalents.270 Explained by the contractarian view, as in
the Coase theorem, when a patent applicant surrenders part of the
patent scope to secure a patent grant, the agreement she transacted with
the PTO does not encompass what was surrendered.271 Therefore, when
268. Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 684.
269. Boone, supra note 224, at 657-85 (observing that the prior art bar is based on the
requirement of patentability; allowing the patent holder to claim equivalency for the scope
covered by the prior art would, ultimately, allow the patent scope which is not patentable).
270. Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84
B.U.L. REV. 63, 98-99 (2004); Folker, supra note 106, at 218-19; Gupta, supra note 261, at 132;
Holbrook, supra note 263, at 22-23.
271. See, e.g., Douglas Lichtman, Rethinking Prosecution History Estoppel, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 151, 153 (2004) (by correcting the claim, the applicant “recognized and emphasized” the
difference between the two terms and “proclaimed his abandonment”). See also Kenneth D.
Bassinger, Unsettled Expectations in Patent Law: Festo and the Moving Target of Claim
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she asserts infringement (i.e., asserting the allocation of P), she may
not base her claim on the patent scope that she surrendered and thus is
not within the scope of rights allocated to her.272 As the Supreme Court
stated in Festo, the aim of file history estoppel is to require the patentee
to hold a consistent position: “the purpose of applying the estoppel in
the first place—to hold the inventor to the representations made during
the application process.”273 Only the contents of the original transaction
between the patent holder and the PTO can be claimed later at the
infringement stage.
From the viewpoint of the agreement between the patent holder
and the patent office, the exception rules to file history estoppel
considerably resemble ascertaining the parties’ true intent behind the
wording of the contract. For instance, the exception rule of
unforeseeability can be explained by the idea that if an embodiment
was unforeseeable at the time of the prosecution of the patent, the
patentee may not be considered to have given up such a laterdevelopment equivalent.274 The rule of tangentialness refers to a
situation where the “language in the claim amendment […] was
inadvertently too narrow” and thus fails to cover the equivalent in
question.275 Tangentialness focuses on the rationale for the narrowing
amendment,276 and it similarly indicates a situation where the patent
holder’s true intent was not to relinquish the equivalent in question. As
explained by Judge Rader, it “honor[s] the objective intent of the
amendment.”277
The disclosure–dedication bar (the public dedication doctrine)
also refers to the contents of the agreement between the patent holder
and the patent office. If subject matter is disclosed in the specification
but unclaimed, the disclosure–dedication bar prevents the patent holder
from recapturing that subject matter through the assertion of the
Equivalence, 48 HOW. L.J. 685, 689 (2005) (noting that “negotiations” between the inventor and
a patent examiner become part of the public record indispensable for ascertaining the scope of a
patent).
272. See Bassinger, supra note 271, at 700 (noting that by amending a claim, the patentee
“surrenders at least some part of that intellectual territory encompassed by the original claim”).
273. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 737-38
(2002).
274. 4 MOY, supra note 121, § 13:111; Holbrook, supra note 263, at 23.
275. 4 MOY, supra note 121, § 13:111. Examples of tangentialness include amendments not
made to avoid prior art, or amendments to avoid nonanalogous prior art. See J. Andrew Lowes &
David L. McCombs, Off on a Tangent: Using Festo’s Second Criterion to Rebut the Presumption
of Surrender, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 579, 585-91 (2006); Peter Lee, Patent Law
and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 50-51 (2010).
276. Lowes & McCombs, supra note 275, at 585.
277. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 344 F.3d 1359, 1370,
1376, n.7 (Rader, J., concurring).
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doctrine of equivalents.278 The fact that the subject matter is disclosed
but not claimed indicates that it is not within the scope of the agreement
that formed the allocation of property rights, and it thus falls within the
scope of non-P. The disclosure–dedication doctrine thus has the same
function as file history estoppel, to distinguish subject matter within or
outside the property rights allocated to the patentee (P or non-P). From
this perspective, similar to the consensus between the patentee and the
PTO, the public dedication doctrine can also be considered a type of
estoppel.279
CONCLUSION
Smith’s brief comment on the similarity between nuisance law
and the doctrine of equivalents leaves room for discussing why the two
sets of doctrines have affinities. Nuisance law can be a universally
applicable prototype that concerns the conflict between the owner’s
right of exclusion and another’s privilege of use, with the conflict
resolution tied to the reasonableness of the use in question. This
prototype can potentially be applied to various issues of intellectual
property law.
Inherent in nuisance law is a model for delineating property rights,
which, according to Smith, is a hybrid regime mixing the exclusion and
the governance strategies.280 This model fulfills the function of
economizing information costs. The transition from the exclusion
strategy to the governance strategy allows harmonization of the
owner’s right of exclusion and another’s claim to use the same asset.
The key to harmonization is the reasonableness of the use. Patent
infringement, involving a transition from literal infringement to
infringement by equivalents, can similarly be considered a hybrid
regime, with the doctrine of equivalents serving the role of
harmonizing use conflicts.
Coase’s theoretical context further elucidates this topic. Inherent
in both nuisance law and the doctrine of equivalents is that the
government allocates property rights when doing so could enhance
well-being.281 The reasonableness test in nuisance law contains a cost–
benefit analysis; in patent law, it requires shifting the Pareto frontier
278. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson Assocs. Inc. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046, 1054 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (en banc); PSC Comput. Prods., Inc. v. Foxconn Int’l, Inc., 355 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 2004); Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 383 F.3d 1326, 1330-31 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
SanDisk Corp. v. Kingston Tech. Co. Inc., 695 F.3d 1348, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
279. 4 MOY, supra note 121, § 13:92 (“[T]he clearly better view is that the rule [of disclosure
dedication] is currently a form of estoppel.”).
280. Smith, supra note 3, at 1046.
281. Id. at 969-71.
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outward to prompt the government to reallocate property rights. The
difference indicates that patent law places special emphasis on
innovation.

